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I. PREFACE
The advent of a panoply of federal regulatory statutes establishing
standards of behavior and proscribing certain conduct in a variety of
economic, political, and social circumstances has produced volumes of
litigation concerning the scope of these statutes. One of the most pervasive
questions facing the courts has been what causes of action are available to
persons who claim to be aggrieved by the violation of a particular statute,
such as the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). 1 This Article will discuss
whether a private cause of action may be implied under the Act in light of
*Andrews, Davis, Legg, Bixler, Milsten & Murrah, Oklahoma City, Okla.
B.S., 1965, Oklahoma State University; J.D., 1968, University of Oklahoma.
**The author acknowledges the assistance of Ms. Gretchen Harris in the
preparation of this Article.
tSubsequent to the author's preparation of this Article, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down the decision of Rivers v.
Rosenthal & Co., No. 79-1313 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 1980). In that decision the court
held that no private right of action exists under the Commodity Exchange Act.
While this holding is consistent with the viewpoint advanced by the author of this
Article, it creates a conflict among the federal courts of appeals. The decisions
rendered prior to Rivers are discussed in this Article.
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER CEA
its statutory language and the legislative history surrounding the com-
prehensive 1974 amendments to the Act, otherwise known as the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTC Act). 2
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMODITIES MARKET
The commodities market is volatile and subject to rapid fluctuation in
price.3 A brief review of commodity transactions is in order. The term
"commodity" is generally taken to describe all the raw materials, and cer-
tain processed materials, which are bought and sold in commerce. The
CEA, as amended, defines a "commodity," in substance, to include all
"goods and articles" and all "services, rights and interests" which may now
or in the future be the subject of futures contracts. 4 Commodities currently
traded include, among others, basic grains such as wheat, corn, oats, and
soybeans and soybean products; livestock and meat; orange juice,
potatoes, sugar, cocoa, and coffee; cotton, wool, lumber, and plywood;
and metals such as copper, silver, gold, platinum, lead, tin, aluminum,
nickel, and zinc. In addition, commodity futures exchanges presently con-
duct trading in currency and interest rate futures. 5
Substantially all trading in commodities has as its basis a contract to
purchase or to sell a specified quantity and quality of a particular com-
modity for delivery at a specified time.6 Generally speaking, if current
delivery of the "physical" commodity (which might be, for instance,
Treasury bills or foreign currency) is contemplated, the trading is "cash"
2. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§
5108, 5314-5316 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has determined
recently that no private right of action exists under the CEA. Rivers v. Rosenthal
& Co., No. 79-1313 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 1980).
3. Prices, which are listed in most major daily newspapers, fluctuate rapid-
ly and over wide ranges. Small price changes can result in large gains or losses.
The market is subject to the many psychological factors working on each buyer
and seller, as well as to crop conditions, inflation and other economic factors,
strikes (especially in the transportation and commodity storage industries), world
conditions, wars or threats of war, balance of payments (surplus or deficit) of par-
ticular countries, political instability, treaties, government policies and exchange
controls, inflation rates, interest rates, and other "fundamental" factors. Any
prediction of commodity prices is subject necessarily to all of these and other fac-
tors, any one of which can change at any time. Even if the current and correct in-
formation to substantially all factors is known, prices still may not react as
predicted.
4. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. III 1979).
5. See Johnston, Understanding the Dynamics of Commodity Trading: A
Success Story, 35 Bus. LAW. 705 (1980).
6. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 4.6, at 421 (1979).
1981]
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or "spot"; if delivery in the future is agreed on, with the likelihood that the
necessity for delivery will be eliminated by later agreement, the contract to
sell or buy is a "futures" contract or "forward" contract.' The kinds of
futures contracts in which active trading occurs today are generally stan-
dardized contracts traded on organized commodity exchanges. 8 Under the
CEA, trading of commodity futures contracts in the United States may
only be done on "designated contract markets," i.e., exchanges registered
with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under the Act.9
Futures trading involves trading in contracts for future delivery of stand-
ardized, rather than specific, lots of particular commodities.10
In market terminology, a trader who "purchases" a futures contract,
i.e., obligates himself to accept delivery and pay the agreed purchase
price, is "long" in the futures market.II Conversely, a trader who "sells" a
futures contract, i.e., obligates himself to make delivery against payment
to him of the agreed purchase price, is "short" in the futures market.1 2 A
commodity futures contract is a binding contractual obligation which, if
held to maturity, will result in the obligation to make or accept delivery of
the physical commodity in exchange for the agreed on price. Prior to the
contractually specified delivery time, however, the contractual obligation
may also be satisfied (and usually is) by "offsetting" the obligation through
the sale or purchase of an equivalent commodity contract on the same ex-
change. Before a trader closes out his long or short position by an offsetting
sale or purchase, his outstanding contracts are known as "open trades" or
"open positions."' s
Two broad classifications of persons who trade in commodity futures
are hedgers and speculators. The goal of the purchaser or investor, known
as a speculator, is to sell futures contracts for a higher price than was in-
itially paid, thus earning a profit on his investment. 4 The speculator rarely
takes delivery of the commodity, but instead closes out the futures position
by entering into offsetting purchases or sales of futures contracts. ',
Commercial interests, which produce, market, process, or otherwise
deal in the underlying physical commodities, use the futures markets
primarily for hedging.' 6 Hedging is a protective procedure designed to
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 6h (1976 & Supp. III 1979).





15. Id. See T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 41 (1979).
See also Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051, at 24,158 n.2
(2d Cir. 1980).
16. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 4.6, at 421.
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assure the expected business profit from the production or dealer activity
by foregoing additional profits and avoiding or minimizing losses which
may occur because of subsequent price fluctuations (e.g., between the
time a merchandiser or processor makes a contract to sell his goods and the
time he must perform the contract). The usual objective of the hedger is to
protect the profit, which he expects to earn from his manufacturing,
production, merchandising, processing, or other operations involving the
physical commodity, computed in a particular currency, rather than to
profit from his futures trading. 17
Because of the unique nature of the commodities market, Congress
began regulating the area in 192118 and has continually updated those
regulations. Today, a comprehensive statutory scheme provides for stand-
ards in commodities activities and the thorough monitoring of those activi-
ties.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE ACT
In 1921 Congress made its first effort to regulate commodity futures
trading. 19 The Future Trading Act levied a tax on all grain futures con-
tracts that were not traded on a designated contract market, and the Sec-
retary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General
were empowered as a commission to enforce the 1921 Act.20 The 1921 Act,
however, did not enjoy a long tenure as it was declared unconstitutional by
the United States Supreme Court. 21 Congress deleted immediately the tax
provisions and enacted the Grain Futures Act in 1922.22 The 1921 Act and
the 1922 Act both had provisions for fines and imprisonment for viola-
tions.23
Congress, in 1936, increased the commodities subject to trading on
designated markets by enacting the Commodity Exchange Act. 24 The
CEA, inter alia, contained antifraud and antimanipulation provisions
with fines and imprisonment sanctions extended beyond those set forth in
the 1921 and 1922 Acts. 25 The Commission designated in the 1921 Act re-
17. Id. See Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051, at
24,159 (2d Cir. 1980); Note, The Delivery Requirement: An Illusory Bar to
Regulation of Manipulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73 YALE L.J. 171, 173
(1963).
18. See Future Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 6(a), 42 Stat. 188.
21. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
22. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
23. E.g., id. § 9, 7 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. III 1979).
24. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
25. Id. § 9, 49 Stat. 1499-1500 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ lOa, 13a
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
1981] 319
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss2/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
mained empowered to enforce the 1936 Act. 26 In 196827 Congress again
decided that additional commodities should be covered by the Act, and
the power of the Secretary of Agriculture over a futures commission mer-
chant was increased. 28
By 1974 consumers who had not traded previously in commodities had
become increasingly aware that traditional investment mediums were be-
ing affected adversely by the spiraling rate of inflation and the continuing
decline in the value of the dollar, and accordingly, began to turn to com-
modities investments. This consumer change created a need for stronger
regulatory control over the commodities markets. 29 Thus, Congress
amended the CEA through enactment of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974,30 in an effort to strengthen the regulation of
commodity transactions on ten commodity exchanges. The CFTC Act
broadened the coverage from agricultural products to any goods and ar-
ticles in which contracts for future delivery might be traded.3 1 Senator
Talmadge, a key sponsor of the CFTC Act, stated that the purpose of the
Act was to create in the commodity area "an agency comparable in statute
and responsibility to the Securities and Exchange Commission. "32
The CFTC Act strengthened considerably the regulatory control of
the commodities markets by creating the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) as an independent federal regulatory agency with ex-
clusive jurisdiction over commodity futures trading.3 3 The CFTC is to ad-
minister and enforce the Act's provisions with specific authority from Con-
gress to go directly into federal courts to seek injunctive relief restraining
any person from violating the Act.34 Additionally, the CFTC has author-
ity, after a hearing, to impose a civil penalty up to $100,000 for each viola-
tion of the Act. 35 The CFTC is also authorized to administer a comprehen-
sive reparations procedure to provide compensatory and punitive damages
for aggrieved investors.36 This new authority, in addition to authority held
26. Id. § 5, 49 Stat. 1492-97 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6a-6i (1976 &
Supp. 1111979)).
27. An Act to Amend the Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 90-258,
82 Stat. 26 (1968) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
28. Id. §§ 7-8, 82 Stat. 28 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6f-6g (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)).
29. See S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2087, 2106; H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
37 (1974).
30. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108,
5314-5316 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. 1111979)).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1111979).
32. 120 CONG. REC. 34,997 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).
33. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. III 1979).
34. Id. § 13a-1 (1976).
35. Id. § 9.
36. Id. § 18 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
[Vol. 46320
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by the Commodity Exchange Commission prior to 1974, includes the
power to issue cease and desist orders, prohibit futures trading by persons
on any futures exchange, and suspend or revoke the registration of persons
registered with the'Commission. s 7 In each of the 1936, 1968, and 1974
enactments, Congress expanded the commodities to be regulated and
manifested a desire that the regulatory authority have sufficient penalties
available to punish violators in order to carry out congressional intent.
IV. LITIGATION IN THE COMMODITIES AREA
Congress, in the Future Trading Act, the 1936 Commodity Exchange
Act, and the 1968 amendments thereto, did not articulate whether persons
seeking to vindicate rights under the CEA could do so in court. Thus, any
private cause of action had to be implied by the court. Prior to 1974, in the
continuing litigation arising from these regulations, a private cause of ac-
tion was assumed routinely by the federal courts hearing commodities
cases in which a plaintiff sought to enforce rights authorized under the Act
or collect damages for violations of its rules and regulations."8
This pre-1974 litigation in the commodities futures field was concerned
generally with fraud by a broker against his customer or churning by the
broker of his customer's account. s 9 Prior to the 1967 decision in Goodman
v. H. Hentz & Co. ,40 however, no court had ever decided the specific issue
of whether an implied right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act
should be recognized despite the fact that violations of the Act were other-
wise enforceable through the Secretary of Agriculture and the Commodity
Exchange Commission. Goodman was a suit in fraud by two customers
against a broker-dealer under section 4b4 1 of the Act. The United States
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Deaktorv. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529, 534(7th Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v.
Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp.
1076, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd sub nom. Miller v. New York Produce Exch.,
550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Arnold v. Bache & Co.,
377 F. Supp. 61, 65 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Gould v. Barnes Brokerage Co., 345 F.
Supp. 294, 295 (N.D. Tex. 1972);Johnson v. Arthur Epsey, Shearson, Hamill &
Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340
F. Supp. 1338, 1343 (E.D. La. 1972), affd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); United
Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn. 1968);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 437 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
39. See, e.g., Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 710
(D. Minn. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 437 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
40. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
41. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976), which prohibits fraud in dealings subject to
regulation by the CEA.
1981]
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District Court for the Northern District of Illinois implied a private remedy
based on a violation of a statutory tort. 42 The Goodman court further
relied on the dissent in the 1961 United States Supreme Court decision of
Wheeldin v. Wheeler,4 which asserted that private rights are "implied
unless the legislation evidences a contrary intention." 44 Of course, in 1967
the CEA did not indicate whether there was an implied right. The Good-
man decision was relied on in many later decisions by district courts and
the federal courts of appeals which found an implied right of action under
the Act, 45 even though the Supreme Court had never decided the issue.
Several cases outside the broker-customer relationship46 were also
litigated. In Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co. ,47 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit implied a private right of action in favor of
a trader against an exchange. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
had manipulated the futures market for frozen pork bellies, and that this
activity had raised artificially the price, resulting in damages. 48 The plain-
tiffs further claimed that the exchanges monopolized trading in the fresh
egg futures market, causing the price to fall.4 9 The Seventh Circuit refused
to defer to the primary jurisdiction of the Commodities Exchange Com-
mission and held that the plaintiffs stated a cause of action under the
Act.50 Although the United States Supreme Court did not decide the issue
whether there was an implied right of action under the Act, it reversed the
Seventh Circuit decision in Deaktor, holding that the Commodity Ex-
change Commission retained primary jurisdiction over the plaintiffs'
claims against the exchanges and that the plaintiffs had to proceed
through the Commodity Exchange Commission and not the courts."1
Deaktor was decided less than a year before the CFTC Act.
Other decisions, however, recognized an implied cause of action out-
42. 265 F. Supp. at 443.
43. 373 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 661 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v.
Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F.
Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
46. Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds per curiam sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113(1973); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
affd sub nom. Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F.
Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
47. 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds per curiam sub nom.
Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. Id. at 530.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 534.
51. 414 U.S. at 115.
[Vol. 46
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side the broker-customer relationship. An implied cause of action under
the CEA criminal penalty provision 52 for manipulation of the Act was
recognized for injunctive relief on behalf of various egg producers against
an import-export firm in United Egg Producers v. Bauer International
Corp.5 3 In reviewing Seligson v. New York Produce Exchange,54 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit implied a cause of
action in favor of the trustee in bankruptcy of a brokerage house against an
exchange, exchange officials, and a clearinghouse. 5
In 1974, with the comprehensive amendments to the CEA, the ques-
tion whether an implied right of action existed was addressed anew by var-
ious federal courts. Irreconcilable decisions have been promulgated. 56
Because Congress in the CFTC Act failed once again to articulate a
definitive statement concerning a private right of action, any such right
must now be implied in light of the statutory language and legislative
history of the CFTC Act and the principles of statutory construction delin-
eated by the United States Supreme Court.
V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPLIED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN
FINDING A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
A cause of action has been defined by the United States Supreme
Court as the authority to invoke judicial power to enforce legal rights and
duties.57 As such, a cause of action is distinct from any question of what
"rights" or "duties" are created under a particular statute.5 8 "The fact that
a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not auto-
matically give rise to a ... cause of action in favor of that person." 59 In-
stead, in the federal system causes of action are normally created by Con-
gress as part of a statutory scheme to enforce the rights and duties it has
created.60 Thus, when Congress provides explicitly for a cause of action 61
for a particular aggrieved party, a court recognizes that cause of action,
52. 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (Supp. 1I 1979).
53. 311 F. Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
54. 378 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd sub nom. Miller v. New York
Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
55. 550 F.2d at 765.
56. See Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Lumber Merchants, Inc., 423 F.
Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (private right of action was implied). But see National
Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 470 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (private right of action was denied).
57. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
58. Id.
59. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
60. 442 U.S. at 241.
61. See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (Supp. III 1979)
(providing explicitly that state attorneys general may institute an action in federal
district court on behalf of aggrieved citizens).
1981]
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evaluates the parties' relative rights and duties, and determines appro-
priate remedies. When, however, Congress has not provided explicitly for
nor denied explicitly a cause of action, the question of judicial implication
of a cause of action arises. This judicial implication has had a long and
often uncertain history in the United States Supreme Court.
The first case decided by the Supreme Court which implied a cause of
action arising from a statute in which none was provided expressly was
Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby. 62 Rigsby sustained the right of a switch-
man to recover damages for violation of the Federal Safety Appliance
Act, although the only express sanctions in the Act were penal. The Court
stated:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages
from the party in default is implied, according to a doctrine of the
common law ... in these words: "So, in every case, where a statute
enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall
have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his
advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary
to the said law. '63
Following Rigsby, the Supreme Court recognized implied causes of ac-
tion on numerous occasions. 6 4 One of the most often quoted rationales
used by the Court is found inJ.L Case Co. v. Borak.65 In that action the
plaintiff, a stockholder of the company, sought to invalidate a merger be-
tween Case and another corporation, and requested damages resulting
from the merger. No section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,66
however, expressly permitted private damage actions by injured share-
holders. The statutory enforcement mechanism only provided for injunc-
tions against prohibited activities prosecuted at the discretion of the
SEC, 6 7 and criminal fines against individuals and exchanges. 68 In implying
a private right of action, the Court stated that "it... [was] the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effec-
tive the congressional purpose.' 69 The Court found that because the SEC
had limited resources private enforcement actions were a necessary supple-
ment to the public enforcement mechanism. 70
62. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
63. Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
64. For a complete discussion of early decisions, see Note, Implying Civil
Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963).
65. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
67. Id. § 78ff (Supp. III 1979).
68. Id.
69. 377 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 432.
[Vol. 46
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In two cases following Borak, the Court continued to imply a cause of
action. 71 In Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States,72 the Court
implied a private cause of action where there was no evidence that Con-
gress intended to create such a right. There was, however, no'legislative
history demonstrating an intent to preclude such a right.73 Moreover, in
Allen v. State Board of Elections,74 the Court expanded Borak to imply a
cause of action where the effectiveness of the statute would be "severely
hampered" without an implied right of action. 75
There were occasions, however, when the Court refused to imply a
private right of action. 76 In Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bar-
bour17 and National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of
Railroad Passengers78 (Amtrak case), the Court held that because the ex-
press language of the statute provided for a particular mode of enforce-
ment, no other mode was to be implied. In Amtrak, the Court held that
the United States Attorney General had authority to police the Amtrak
system, and that the enforcement scheme provided for substantial supervi-
sion of the rail passenger system, thus necessitating no private right of ac-
tion to private parties. 79 In Barbour, the Court used the same rationale,
finding that Congress had vested a public body (the SEC) with enforce-
ment of the Act"0 and that "there is no indication in the legislative history
of the . . . [Security Investors Protection Act] that Congress ever con-
templated a private right of action parallel to that expressly given to the
SEC."8 1 The Court concluded in Barbour, as it had in Amtrak, that "ex-
71. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (suit by individual
voters challenging local voting enactments under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389
U.S. 191 (1967) (suit by the government to recover expenses incurred in removal
of sunken barge).
72. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
73. Id. at 200.
74. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
75. Id. at 556-57.
76. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412
(1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453 (1974); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); T.I.M.E., Inc. v.
United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
77. 421 U.S. 412 (1975). The question involved was whether the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976 & Supp. III
1979), provided an implied right of action for customers against broker-dealers.
78. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). The plaintiffs asserted an implied right of action
under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-650 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), to prevent discontinuance of rail service.
79. 414 U.S. at 464-65.
80. 421 U.S. at 420.
81. Id. at 421.
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press statutory provisions for one form of proceeding ordinarily implies
that no other means of enforcement was intended by the Legislature."8 2
The Supreme Court similarly refused to imply a private right of action
in T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States.83 In T.I.M.E., a shipper attempted to
bring a private action against a motor carrier for charging unreasonable
rates in violation of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act.8 4 The Court
examined the Act, noting that Parts I and III of the Act provided expressly
a right of action to shippers against rail (Part I) and water (Part III) car-
riers, but stated that such an action was conspicuously absent in Part II,
which applied to motor carriers.8 5 The Court then refused to extend the
private right of action to motor carrier shippers under the Act.8 6
Moreover, the Court rejected the contention that the Act preserved a com-
mon law right to bring an action.8 7 The Court rejected the proposition that
because Congress had been aware of a common law action prior to the
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act, its failure to legislate abroga-
tion of that right implied approval and acceptance of it.88
In summary, prior to 1975 the Court implied rights of action where it
was "necessary to effectuate the intent of the statute," where there was no
legislative history which evidenced an intent to preclude a cause of action,
or where Congress had enacted no alternative means for enforcement of
the statute which would substantially redress grievances.8 9 The Court,
however, refused to grant a cause of action where a comprehensive
enforcement procedure existed" and, in at least one case, where no
private rights were delineated in one section of an Act but were specifically
enumerated in other sections. 91
In 1975 the Court assimilated the reasoning which had emerged in the
prior cases concerning an implication of a cause of action in the seminal
case of Cort v. Ash. 92 In determining whether a private remedy was im-
plicit in a statute not expressly providing one, the Court identified four
factors to be used:
82. Id. at 419. See Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 458.
83. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
84. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976) (current version included at 49 U.S.C. §§
10521-11916 (Supp. III 1979)).
85. 359 U.S. at 470.
86. Id. at 472.
87. Id. at 474.
88. Id. at 478.
89. See text accompanying notes 62-75 supra.
90. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
91. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
92. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the plaintiff, a shareholder of a corpora-
tion, alleged that political advertisements by the corporation during the 1972
presidential election violated a criminal provision of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (repealed 1976).
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First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby . . . -that
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? See, e.g., Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad
Passengers .... Third, is it consistent with the underlying pur-
poses of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? See, e.g., Amtrak . . . ; Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Barbour .. .; Calhoon v. Harvey .... And finally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? See
Wheeldin v. Wheeler... ; cf. J.L Case Co. v. Borak. . . ; Bivensv.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents .... 93
Until 1979 the approach delineated in Cort enjoyed a general accep-
tance. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,94 Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,95 and Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. ,9 the Court utilized
consistently the four-pronged analysis. The Court's analysis was particu-
larly articulate in Piper.97 The Court first examined the language of the
statute98 and, finding it silent as to a private right, turned to the legislative
history and purpose and the necessity of implying a private cause of action
to effectuate Congress' goals. 99 The Court determined ultimately that a
tender offerer was not a member of the class for whose benefit the Williams
Act was enacted, 1 00 that the legislative history evinced no intent to imply a
private right of action, 101 that a private remedy was, in fact, inconsistent
with the legislative scheme, 1 02 and that relegating a complainant to state
law was appropriate. 10 3
The Court continued the Cort methodology but reached a different
result in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 10 4 implying a private right of ac-
93. 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
94. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). The Supreme Court held that no private right of ac-
tion was implied by Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§
1301-1303 (1976), which provides that no tribe shall deny to its members equal
protection of the laws.
95. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The Court found no private right of action for
minority stockholders under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1976), absent misrepresentation or lack of disclosure.
96. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The act in question was the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(e) (1976).
97. 430 U.S. at 24-42.
98. Id. at 25.
99. Id. at 26-37.
100. Id. at 37.
101. Id. at 38-39.
102. Id. at 39-40.
103. Id. at 40-41.
104. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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tion under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972.105 The
plaintiff, a female who was refused admission to two private medical
schools, alleged sex discrimination in her denial. While Title IX author-
ized federal agencies to withhold funds from offending programs,'0 5 no
private cause of action or other enforcement mechanism was expressly pro-
vided for in the statute.
The Court, explicitly referring to Cort, concluded that the plaintiff
was an especial beneficiary of Title IX and that sex discrimination tradi-
tionally had been relegated to federal rather than state law. Additionally,
the Court felt that there was sufficient evidence of congressional intent to
create a private right of action. 0 7 The Court found persuasive legislative
history which compared Title IX to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,10 8 and determined that Congress had relied on a judicial construction
of Title IX consistent with the private right of action which had been im-
plied under Title VI. 109 The Court stated that "[i]t is always appropriate to
assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the
law.""10 The Court, quoting Cort v. Ash, concluded that where, " 'it is
clear that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not
necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although
an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling.' "I"
Finally, the Court in Cannon evaluated an implied cause of action in
light of its necessity or contribution to the accomplishment of the statutory
purpose. 1 2 The Court determined that the express administrative
remedy, a cutoff of federal funds to the offending institution, would not
adequately redress the grievances of a private plaintiff complaining of sex-
based discrimination. 113 Moreover, the Court found that the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare was unable administratively to vin-
dicate individual rights. 114
While Cannon seemed to portend an expansive interpretation of Cort,
the concurring and dissenting opinions indicated that several members of
the Court were dissatisfied with the Cort analysis. Justices Rehnquist and
Stewart, while concurring, said that Cannon presented an extraordinary
case for implication, perhaps because of its civil rights connotations, and
that Congress should not continue to rely on the courts to decide when
private actions were appropriate." 5 Justices White and Blackmun
105. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
106. Id. § 1682.
107. 441 U.S. at 694-701.
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
109. 441 U.S. at 696.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 694 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 82).
112. Id. at 703.
113. Id. at 705.
114. Id. at 707-08 n.42.
115. Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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dissented, arguing that Congress intended the withholding of funds to be
the exclusive means of enforcing the statute. 116 Justice Powell, in dissent,
directly challenged the Cort analysis, arguing that any analysis other than
a search for legislative intent violated the principle of separation of
powers.1 17
Subsequent to the decision in Cannon, the Supreme Court in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington,"18 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis," 9 and Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press120 indicated a retreat from the expansive language of Cannon. In
Touche Ross, a private plaintiff sought to bring an action under section
17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934121 against an accounting firm
for false financial statements resulting from an audit of a firm covered by
the federal securities acts. In holding that no private cause of action ex-
isted, the Court did not apply the first, third, or fourth factors of Cort, but
instead, looked only to the language of the statute. The Court stated that
section 17(a) did not create any private rights in any identifiable class or
proscribe any conduct as unlawful, nor did the legislative history of the
section speak to the issue of private actions. 122 The Court found that the
four Cort factors were not entitled to equal weight, but that the central in-
quiry was whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or im-
pliedly, a private cause of action.123
In Transamerica, the newly restrictive approach articulated by the
dissent in Cannon and the majority in Touche Ross continued. The Court
refused to imply a private cause of action under section 206 of the Investor
Advisors Act of 1940.124 The Court articulated the principle enunciated in
Amtrak:
Yet it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a
statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court
must be chary of reading others into it. "When a statute limits a
thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of
any other mode.' '1 25
The Transamerica Court found that specific sections of the Investors
Protection Act provided for an adequate means of enforcing compliance
with the Act,126 and citing Cannon, stated that where there are alternative
remedies "it is highly improbable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to
116. Id. at 718-19 (White, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
118. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
119. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
120. 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
122. 422 U.S. at 569-71.
123. Id. at 575.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
125. 444 U.S. at 19-20 (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 20.
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mention an intended private action.' ",127 Moreover, the Court found that
where such alternative remedies exist, the resultant restrictive statutory
construction will yield only "to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative
intent."12
The analysis of Transamerica was upheld in Kissinger v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press,1 29 an action brought pursuant to a
section of the Freedom of Information Act. 3 0 The Kissinger Court held
that where the statute in question proscribed conduct and did not create or
alter civil liabilities, and where administrative remedies were provided, no
private cause of action could be implied, particularly where the legislative
history showed no intent to establish such a right.'13
The present state of judicial interpretation of a private cause of action
indicates that, absent express statutory language or legislative intent, a
statute must confer private rights in certain individuals or proscribe cer-
tain conduct as illegal in order for a private action to exist. 32 Moreover, if
a statute which confers private rights provides alternative administrative
remedies and there exists no persuasive legislative history to the contrary,
no private cause of action may be implied. 133 Additionally, the rationale of
Cannon may apply only in the "extraordinary" civil rights case or, at least,
where there is persuasive evidence of legislative intent to create a private
right of action, and then only when alternative remedies are demonstrably
inadequate to redress specific private rights provided in a particular
statute.
VI. THE IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER
THE CFTC ACT
The 1974 CFTC Act contains no language that remotely suggests con-
gressional intent to create an implied right of action. Some courts,
however, have implied certain types of private rights of action under the
Act, 3 4 while some have denied such a right. 35 In 1980 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Leist v. Simplot,3 6 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Curran v. Merrill
127. Id. (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
128. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
129. 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
131. 445 U.S. at 149-50.
132. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
133. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136
(1980); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
134. See, e.g., Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Lumber Merchants, Inc., 423 F. Supp.
559 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
135. See, e.g., Liang v. Hunt, 477 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
136. 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,137 implied private rights of action
under the CFTC Act. Both courts held that the failure of Congress in the
1974 amendments to extinguish expressly an implied private right of ac-
tion in light of the previously recognized right provided a sufficient basis to
recognize an implied right. 138 This reasoning, however, ignores the 1959
decision of the United States Supreme Court in T.LM.E., Inc. v. United
States, 13 9 where the Court held that congressional silence with respect to a
private right of action under a statute cannot be interpreted as approval by
Congress that the courts are to recognize a private right of action. 140 The
rule adopted in T.I.M.E. remains valid, as indicated by the recent deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in SEC v. Sloan.'4 ' In Sloan, the Court rejected
the SEC's argument that Congress, by being aware of the Commission's
prior construction of a particular statute, had approved therefore the
Commission's construction by not rejecting specifically the construction in
the adoption of the statute. 142 The Supreme Court noted that it was "ex-
tremely hesitant" to presume that Congress was fully aware of the Commis-
sion's construction based on only a few isolated statements in thousands of
pages of legislative documents. 4 3 The Supreme Court stated:
For here its invocation would result in a construction of the statute
which not only is at odds with the language of the section in ques-
tion and the pattern of the statute taken as a whole, but also is ex-
tremely far reaching in terms of the virtually untrammeled and
unreviewable power it would vest in a regulatory agency.
Even if we were willing to presume such general awareness on
the part of Congress, we are not at all sure that such awareness at
the time of re-enactment would be tantamount to amendment of
what we concede to be the rather plain meaning of the language of§ 12(k).' 4 4
As a result of congressional failure to provide specifically for a private
cause of action under the CFTC Act, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis 45 dictates that the language of the statute must be examined
to determine if an alternative remedy exists which would thus preclude a
private right of action. 146 Congress has prescribed redress for violations of
the CFTC Act in specific statutory language therein. The CFTC was
authorized in 1974 to conduct customer reparation proceedings.1'4 A com-
137. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980).
138. 2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051, at 24,173; 622 F.2d at 235-36.
139. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
140. Id. at 478.
141. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
142. Id. at 119-20.
143. Id. at 121.
144. Id."
145. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
146. Id. at 19-20.
147. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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modity customer who believes that a violation of the CFTC Act or Com-
mission regulations has been caused by a person registered under the Act,
or one who should have registered, may within two years file a complaint
with the CFTC for damages. 4 8 Should the person who has been ordered to
pay damages fail to do so within the time specified in the CFTC's order, the
court in the United States district in which such person resides may be used
to enforce the reparation award. 49 It is further provided that any Com-
mission order is reviewable by the United States court of appeals. 5 0 Thus,
there seems to be little need to imply private rights of action when an al-
leged wrong can be heard by those familiar with the subject of com-
modities' 5 ' and when damages, both compensatory and punitive, may be
awarded. Additionally, an administrative civil penalty of up to $100,000
for each violation is set forth in the Act. 5 2
The CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts and
agreements where transactions for the sale of commodity futures contracts
are involved. 53 Congress, however, admittedly created an ambiguity by
placing a "savings clause" in the jurisdictional provision of the CFTC
Act.15 4 The savings clause provides that the jurisdictional provision is not
to be interpreted as superseding or limiting the jurisdiction of the SEC or
any other regulatory agency of the United States or of any state. 5 5 Addi-
tionally, the savings clause concludes that "[n]othing in this section shall
supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States
or any State.'" 56
The dissent in the Second Circuit decision of Leist v. Simplot5 7 con-
tended that the savings clause was added to clarify the House of Represent-
atives version of the jurisdictional provision of the CFTC Act, which was
interpreted by some members of the House as prohibiting state courts from
acting in contract claims and the federal courts from exercising jurisdic-
tion over antitrust claims and suits seeking review of administrative hear-
ings.1 5 8 Even if this argument is not adopted, it is clear nonetheless that the
savings clause is a jurisdictional matter, and as the Supreme Court held in
148. Id. § 18(e) (1976).
149. Id. § 18(f).
150. Id. § 18(g).
151. Id. § 18(a) (Supp. III 1979).
152. Id. § 9 (1976).




157. 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051, at 24,214-15 (2d'Cir. 1980)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting).
158. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Hearings on S. 2485,
S. 2578, S. 2837 & H.R. 13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture &
Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 259-60 (1974) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
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Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,5 9 "[T]he source of plaintiffs' rights
must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the ... [Act] which
they seek to enforce, not in the jurisdictional provision."1 60
Finally, the CFTC Act does not have the counterpart that is enjoyed by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 161 which grants the federal courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction for violations of the Act and its regulations. Since Con-
gress was so precise in giving federal courts jurisdiction for violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it is difficult to understand why they
would not have been as clear with the CFTC Act if they desired to create
private rights of action.
A review of the legislative history, as necessitated by the Cort analysis,
does not assist in determining whether or not Congress intended to recog-
nize a private right of action under the CFTC Act. 162 The Senate Commit-
tee Report regarding the CFTC Act is devoid of a single mention of private
civil actions.16 3 Senator Hart did introduce a bill which would have ex-
pressly authorized private civil suits for violations of the Act and treble
damages for willful violations,1 64 but Congress rejected the bill even after
the Senate Committee heard testimony from witnesses appearing
specifically to urge adoption of the private right of action. 65
There are several references to an implied private right of action in the
history of the legislation of the Act before the House of Representatives. 66
The majority in Leist v. Simplot 67 found legislative support for the prop-
osition that Congress intended to continue to recognize a private right of
action in the comments of several members of Congress. 68 As suggested by
the dissent in Leist, however, speeches by the Congressmen were little
more than recognition that some courts were implying a private right of
159. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
160. Id. at 577.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
162. See H.R. REP. NO. 975, 93d Cong., 2dSess. (1974); S. REP. NO. 1131,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843.
163. S. REP. NO. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843.
164. S. 2837, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 505(a)-505(b) (1973), reprinted in Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission Act: Hearings on S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837
& H.R. 13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture & Forestry, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 79 (1974).
165. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Hearings on S. 2485, S.
2578, S. 2837 &H.R. 13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture &Forestry,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 205, 317, 415, 737, 746 (1974).
166. H.R. REP. NO. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974); 119 CONG. REc.
41,333 (1973).
167. 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051 (2d Cir. 1980).
168. 120 CONG. REC. 30,459 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge); id. at
10,737 (remarks of Rep. Poage).
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action and should not be deemed as approval of an implied right of
action.1 69
Those who argue that Congress intended to imply a private right of ac-
tion have interpreted statements of Chairman Poage in the House to mean
that the remedies created by the 1974 amendments were not in addition to
the express remedies already contained in the Commodity Exchange Act,
but rather, were supplementary to an implied private right of action.1 0 As
Judge Mansfield, however, stated in Leist:
The few comments relied upon by the majority as evidence of
Congress' intent to approve a private right of action are also too
vague and abstruse to entitle them to any appreciable weight.
First, the majority overstates the significance of Chairman Poage's
statement that the act "sets up new consumer protection features."
... It is not surprising that Chairman Poage used the term "new"
to describe the Act's enforcement provisions, including the
CFTC's authority to bring suits and levy civil penalties and the
reparations procedure, since these provisions were "new." By the
use of the term "new" Chairman Poage did not mean that the
remedies were "in addition to" or "supplementary" to implied
private right of action. At most he meant that the remedies were in
addition to the express remedies already contained in the Act. Had
he intended that these remedies supplement implied private rights
of action, he would have said so directly, not through an am-
biguous reference to "new" remedies. 17
There is no express statement in any of the legislative history to affirm
any private right of action. In light of the statement in Transamerica that
there must be persuasive legislative history of a contrary intent to grant a
private right of action where there is an express remedy provided, 17 2 none
can be implied.
In 1978 Congress made further amendments to the CFTC Act. 7 s
Again, there is no reference to a private right of action despite Congress'
awareness that lower courts had commenced to deny private rights of ac-
tion under the Act. 174 Congress also must have been aware in 1978 of the
United States Supreme Court's adoption of stricter principles governing
the implication of private causes of action. 175 The most noticeable amend-
169. 2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051, at 24,190-91 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting). See also T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. at 475.
170. 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051, at 24,212 n.19.
171. Id. (citation omitted).
172. 444 U.S. at 19-20.
173. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (codified
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
174. See, e.g., Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865
(D. Conn. 1977); Consolo v. Homblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., 436 F.
Supp. 447 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535
(D. Neb. 1976), affd on other grounds, 571 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1978).
175. See text accompanying notes 92-103 supra.
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ment by Congress was to eliminate the hearing requirement of the CFTC
Act for reparation claims which were less than $5,000.116 In addition, Con-
gress empowered the states to bring suits in federal courts to enjoin alleged
violations of the Act or to obtain monetary damages. 7 7 Even after Senator
Huddleston pointed out that courts were no longer uniformly implying a
private action, 1 78 Congress did not create such a right. There can be little
doubt that by 1978 Congress was aware of how to create a private right of
action in favor of a person alleging violations of the Act, and would have
done so if it wished.179
The statutory construction principles of Cort v. Ash, 180 Transamerica
Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis,""' and Touche Ross & Co. v. Reding-
ton 8 2 indicate that no private right of action should be implied under the
CFTC Act. Some courts, however, may be inclined to imply a private right
of action under the CFTC Act based on the decision in Cannon v. Universi-
ty of Chicago.83 Caution must be exercised because Cannon can be
distinguished on several grounds. First, Cannon was a civil rights case, and
the statute that was the subject of the litigation in Cannon, Title IX, 114 was
re-enacted in almost identical form to a prior civil rights statute. 85 The
1974 CFTC Act was not a re-enactment of the Commodity Exchange Act,
but rather, took a completely different approach. The civil rights statute
that was the subject of litigation in Cannon in no way provided relief as the
CFTC Act does. HEW was not given any authority to proceed against
alleged violations as was the CFTC, nor did Congress give HEW any
reparation procedure to remedy violations. It is, rather than Cannon,
Transamerica186 and Touche Ross'87 which should control any analysis of
the implication of a private right of action.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act created a
uniform and comprehensive system to regulation of commodities. A
review of those amendments does not support the view that private rights
of action are consistent with that purpose.
In recent years judges have been heard to complain of the burdens
their courts suffer from an overcrowded docket; yet, when judges have the
176. 7 U.S.C. § 18(b) (Supp. III 1979).
177. Id. § 13a-2.
178. 124 CONG. REC. 10,537 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston).
179. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 22 n.13.
180. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
181. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
182. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
183. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
184. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
186. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
187. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
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opportunity to reduce their burden, such as denying a private right of ac-
tion when one is not specifically granted, they refuse to do so. Congress, in
its best effort in the 1974 amendments, gave the courts every reason to
deny a private right of action. At least two courts of appeals, however,
have taken an ambiguity and construed the statute to create more litiga-
tion, resulting in the further overburdening of our court system. 18 8 With
an elaborate reparation procedure available under the CFTC Act, there
seems little need for consumer-implied rights to be recognized by the
courts, and the logic of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Touche Ross
and Transamerica indicates strongly that a private right of action under
the CEA should be denied by the courts.
188. See cases cited notes 136 & 137 and accompanying text supra. But see
Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., No. 79-1313,(5th Cir. Dec. 16, 1980).
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